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Formalization of legal concepts
Philosophy of action
Most juridical systems contain the principle that an act is only unlawful if the agent
conducting the act has a ‘guilty mind’ (‘mens rea’). Different law systems distinguish
different modes of mens rea. For instance, American law distinguishes between ‘knowingly’
performing a criminal act, ‘recklessness’, ‘strict liability’, etc. This paper shows we can
formalize several of these categories. The formalism used is a complete stit logic featuring
operators for actions taking effect in next states, operators for S5-knowledge and operators
for SDL-type obligation. The different modes of ‘mens rea’ correspond to the violation
conditions of different types of obligation deﬁnable in the logic.
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1. Introduction
An important distinction in law is the one between ‘actus reus’, which translates to ‘guilty act’, and ‘mens rea’ for ‘guilty
mind’. It is a general principle of law that both these conditions should be met for an act to qualify as criminal, that is,
guilt not only presupposes a forbidden act as such, also, the performing agent must have committed the act knowingly,
intentionally, purposely, etc.1 The task of showing that both necessary conditions ‘actus reus’ and ‘mens rea’ apply to an
alleged criminal act, is in law referred to as ‘showing concurrence’.
There are different levels of mens rea, each corresponding to different levels of culpability. And, of course, different law
systems have different categories. The current North American system works with the following modes, in decreasing order
of culpability (as taken from [20]):
• Purposefully – the actor has the “conscious object” of engaging in conduct and believes and hopes that the attendant
circumstances exist.
• Knowingly – the actor is certain that his conduct will lead to the result.
• Recklessly – the actor is aware that the attendant circumstances exist, but nevertheless engages in the conduct that a
“law-abiding person” would have refrained from.
• Negligently – the actor is unaware of the attendant circumstances and the consequences of his conduct, but a “reason-
able person” would have been aware.
• Strict liability – the actor engaged in conduct and his mental state is irrelevant.
The ﬁrst class, the one of acts committed purposefully, is about acts that are instrumental in reaching an agent’s malicious
goal. The second class is not directly about an agent’s intentions, aims or goals, but only about whether or not an agent
knows what it is doing. The third class is a little less clear. However, it is defendable to interpret it as the category of acts
where an agent knowingly risks an unlawful outcome. For the fourth category, not knowing the (possible, or necessary –
E-mail address: broersen@cs.uu.nl.
1 The general principle was already formulated back in 1797, by the English jurist Edward Coke: “actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea”, which is Latin
for “an act does not make somebody guilty unless his/her mind is also guilty”.1570-8683/$ – see front matter © 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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category concerns the complete absence of mens rea. This is the category where agents can be culpable without having a
guilty mind whatsoever.
The levels of culpability correspond to (1) levels of excusability and (2) levels of deontic strength.2 For the ﬁrst class, the
deontic strength is lowest of all and several excuses apply. In particular, for this class an actus reus can be accompanied by
the valid excuses: “I did not have bad intentions”, “I did not know what I was doing”, and so on. For the second category,
deontic strength is higher, and fewer excuses apply. In particular, the excuse that there were no bad intentions is no longer
acceptable. What counts is that the agent knew what it was doing, irrespective of the goal the act was aimed at. For the
third category, where the deontic strength is yet higher, it is not even an excuse that the agent was not sure about the
outcome: the agent is liable simply because it took a risk that led to an unlawful outcome. In the fourth category, the
excuse that the agent simply did not realize what the consequences of his act are, is no longer valid: for any violation of
a prohibition in this category it is still liable, because any ‘reasonable’ agent would have foreseen the consequences. And
ﬁnally, for the strict liability category, deontic strength is highest of all, and no excuses referring to the mental state of an
agent apply whatsoever.3
In philosophy, the idea that excuses play an important role in distinguishing different modes of acting was put forward
by Austin [5]. And many other kinds of excuses than the ones above are thinkable. For instance, among the most well-
known excuses for violating an obligation are: “I was not able to”, “I do not agree my act counts-as a violation”, “I obeyed
a stronger, conﬂicting obligation” and “I did not know I had to”. Of these, this paper only considers the ﬁrst and the last
one. The ﬁrst one, about not being able to comply to an obligation, is only a valid excuse if the principle of “ought implies
can” applies. The last one, concerning knowledge of the condition that the act is obliged, refers directly to the juridical
principle “ignorantia juris non excusat”, which translates to “ignorance of or mistake about the law is no defence”. So, here
the (absence of) excuse is not so much about the mode of acting, as in the modes of mens rea above, but about whether or
not the agent knows about the ‘deontic status’ of the act. This maybe a subtle different with the described modes of mens
rea and is not made very clear in the juridical literature. But, in our formalizations it will be.
We will also look at how we can formally deﬁne what counts as an actus reus. Again, the juridical literature gives
precise deﬁnitions. In particular, an actus reus cannot be an involuntary act. For instance, a person being thrown off a high
building, surviving his fall by crashing into another person, who gets killed as the result of functioning as a cushion, has not
committed an actus reus, even though the falling person knew that it actually was crashing into the person. The current
American Model Penal Code [20] lists what acts count as involuntary acts for which no agent can be liable:
• a reﬂex or convulsion,
• a bodily movement during unconsciousness or sleep,
• conduct during hypnosis or resulting from hypnotic suggestion,
• a bodily movement that otherwise is not a product of the effort or the determination of the actor, either conscious or
habitual.
The goal of this paper is to analyze the concepts of actus reus, and the levels of mens rea, culpability, excusability, and
deontic strength by formal means. To that end, we deﬁne a formal stit logic. The acronym stit stands for ‘seeing to it that’,
referring to the central modality of the logic that expresses that groups of agent are responsible for a certain action effect
occurring. The main goal of this paper is not to present the formal logic. However, of course, we want the formal basis to
be sound, which is why we give a formal semantics and a completeness result.
We will formalize (1) the different modes of mens rea with the exception of the ﬁrst category concerning purposeful acts,
(2) different modes of actus reus, that is, voluntary acts, (3) the condition of “ignorantia juris non excusat”. The mens rea
class of purposeful acts is not considered because we do not consider goals and intentions; this subject will be considered
in a separate paper. Almost all the other categories concern conditions referring to an agent’s knowledge about his actions.
And knowledge operators will be a central concern of this paper. More speciﬁcally, we will come up with many different
notions of obligation (following common practice in deontic logic, we will treat obligations and prohibitions on a par, and
see prohibitions as obligations to act oppositely), many of which can be associated with one of the classes of mens rea.
The plan of this paper is as follows. First, in Section 2 we deﬁne a stit logic that forms the action logic fundament of
our investigations. Then, in Section 3, we show how to add an epistemic dimension to the base logic, to enable modeling of
the notion of ‘knowingly doing’ that will be central in formalizing the modes of mens rea. Then, in Section 4, we will ﬁrst
concentrate on how to represent an actus reus, without a deontic bearing. Finally, in Section 5, the deontic operators are
introduced. In this section we deﬁne the different types of obligation that correspond to different modes of mens rea. The
ﬁnal section discusses conclusions, related work, future research, and implications of this work.
2 I am not aware of any law or philosophical literature where this triple correspondence has been observed before, but I do not doubt there is.
3 An additional observation is that for more serious crimes the distinction between the mens rea modes is more relevant than for less serious crimes. If
you walk through a red traﬃc light, the police oﬃcer will not even consider your excuse that you did not do it knowingly (you are strictly liable). But, if
there is a case where your way of conduct resulted in some person’s death an excuse of this type is certainly going to be looked at.
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In this section we deﬁne a complete stit logic where actions take effect in next states: XSTIT. For those unfamiliar with
the stit framework: the characters ‘stit’ are an acronym for ‘seeing to it that’. Stit logics [8,9] originate in philosophy. They
are endogenous logics of action, that is, actions are not explicitly represented as action terms in the object language. To be
more precise, expressions [A stit : ϕ] of stit logic stand for ‘agents A see to it that ϕ ’, where ϕ possibly contains temporal
operators. However, where philosophers write ‘[A stit : ϕ]’, we prefer to write ‘[A stit]ϕ ’, to be more in line with standard
modal logic notation. The main virtue of stit logics is that, unlike most (if not all) other logical formalisms for action, they
talk directly about choice exertion.
The initial version of the logic XSTIT was investigated in [12] and was then used as the basis for the deﬁnition of deontic
operators in the workshop version of the present article [11]. Here we change the logic on two points. We no longer deﬁne
the next operator as an abbreviation of the agency operator but introduce it as a separate modality. This allows us to give a
slightly weaker interpretation of the agency operator. But, in another sense we will make the logic stronger: we will equate
settledness in the next state with Ags-effectivity.4
In [17] we used the almost identical name ‘X-STIT’ for a quite different stit logic. Still, the difference between that logic
and the present one is well symbolized by the separation of the ‘X’ and the acronym ‘STIT’. This refers to the fact that in
[17] the classical instantaneous stit operator is extended with an independent next operator, while in the present stit variant
effectivity of stit operators itself refers to next states. In [17], action and time are not coupled: next states are not necessarily
the ones brought about by agents in the system.5 This leads to many differences with the stit logic(s) in [17]. In particular,
the present logic drops the axioms in [17] that are due to the instantaneous character of that paper’s stit operators, adds
axioms that are speciﬁc for ensuring that effects occur in next states, couples actions and time, and is complete. Also, here
we use a two-dimensional semantics, closer to the stit semantics in the philosophical literature.
The fact that the present stit logic adopts the ontological commitment that actions only take effect in next states, where
‘next’ refers to the immediate possible successors of a state, distinguishes it from any stit logic in the (philosophical) liter-
ature. This choice has as a positive side effect that the logic is axiomatizable (and decidable). The logics of the multi-agent
versions of the standard instantaneous stit, are undecidable and not ﬁnitely axiomatizable [6,22]. One motivation for only
looking at next states comes from computer science, where this is a standard view in formal models of computation. But,
this choice also ﬁts naturally with the example scenarios we will discuss. These scenarios are all suitably modeled using sets
of subsequent choice points where the effects of choices take effect in the next choice point. Actually, it seems quite hard
to come up with a scenario that deﬁnitely requires we adopt the ontological commitment that effects are instantaneous.6
Note that we do not assume anything about how distant subsequent choice points should be; they can be arbitrarily close.
The modal language of XSTIT is given by the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 2.1. Given a countable set of propositions P and p ∈ P , and given a ﬁnite set Ags of agent names, and A ⊆ Ags,
the formal language LXSTIT is:
ϕ := p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ |ϕ | [A xstit]ϕ | Xϕ
Besides the usual propositional connectives, the syntax of XSTIT comprises three modal operators. The operator ϕ
expresses ‘historical necessity’, and plays the same role as the well-known path quantiﬁers in logics such as CTL and CTL∗
[21]. Another way of talking about this operator is to say that it expresses that ϕ is ‘settled’. Settledness does not necessarily
mean that a property is always true in the future (as often thought). Settledness may, in general, apply to the condition
that ϕ occurs ‘some’ time in the future, or to some other temporal property. This is reﬂected by the fact that settledness is
interpreted as a universal quantiﬁcation over the branching dimension of time, and not over the dimension of duration. The
operator [A xstit]ϕ stands for ‘agents A jointly see to it that ϕ in the next state’. The third modality is the next operator
Xϕ .7 It has a standard interpretation as the transition to a next static state.
Our stit operator concerns, what game-theorists call, ‘one-shot’ actions. We can also imagine to have a strategic stit
operator (see [16]) where it is assumed that groups of agents have multiple subsequent choice points to ensure a certain
condition (game-theorists call these ‘extensive games’). Such a setting particularly makes sense if we increase expressivity
of the temporal sub-language, and go beyond what can be expressed by the next operator alone. For instance, ensuring a
condition ‘some time in the future’ may in general involve several choices in a row, and is not necessarily accomplished by
4 There is an issue with naming logics here. A logic is the subset of valid formulas of a language. So, strictly speaking, by weakening and strengthening
earlier deﬁnitions, we get another logic, and thus we should use another name. However, the earlier deﬁnition was not the intended one, and can, in that
sense, be said to be mistaken. The present logic is the intended XSTIT.
5 We discuss the issue of this lack of ‘success preservation’ in the ﬁnal section of [17]. In the present logic, the coupling of time and action is guaranteed
by the (Ags = XSett) condition/axiom.
6 Maybe we should think in the direction of ‘mental effects’ of choices.
7 In two earlier (workshop proceedings) accounts of XSTIT [12,11] the next operator was deﬁned through the abbreviation Xϕ ≡def [Ags xstit]ϕ . However,
this has undesirable consequences. As a consequence Xϕ → Xϕ is derivable, which, with determinism for the X , gives that the frames can only be such
that the interpretation of the  reduces to the identity relation in next states.
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a one-shot action. But, of course, it cannot be excluded that a one-shot action determines a long term effect, which justiﬁes
why in the one-shot stit-logics in the philosophical literature one studies the stronger temporal operators. However, it is
somewhat surprising that the philosophical literature does not also study the next operator.
In the description of the structures, below, we will use terminology inspired by similar terminology from Coalition Logic
[31] (CL), and call the relations interpreting the stit operator ‘effectivity’ relations. However, the effectivity relations are not
just the relational equivalent of the effectivity functions of CL. The effectivity relations we use are relative to histories and
determine a set of possible outcomes modulo a given history. Effectivity functions in CL are only relative to a state, and
yield sets of sets of possible outcomes.
Before giving the formal deﬁnition of the frames, let us consider brieﬂy the main difference with classical stit frames,
like the ones in the book of Horty [25]. In classical stit, as said, effects are instantaneous. To give semantics to that, in the
frames the present static state in partitioned into choice sets. In the stit logic in this paper effects occur in next states, and
thus, the choice partitioning is also with respect to next states.
After the deﬁnition of the frames, we explain the elements they are build from using the two visualizations of XSTIT-
frames in Figs. 1 and 2.
Deﬁnition 2.2. An XSTIT-frame is a tuple 〈S, H, RX , R, {RA | A ⊆ Ags}〉 such that:
• S is an inﬁnite set of static states. Elements of S are denoted s, s′ , etc.8
• H ⊆ 22S\∅ \ ∅ is a non-empty set of histories, which are ordered inﬁnite sub-sets of S . Elements of H are denoted h,
h′ , etc. Dynamic states are tuples 〈s,h〉, with s ∈ S , h ∈ H and s ∈ h. Histories receive their order from the next state
relation RX over dynamic states: s′ is next of s on h if and only if 〈s,h〉RX 〈s′,h〉.9
• RX is a ‘next state’ relation that is serial and deterministic, and if 〈s,h〉RX 〈s′,h′〉 then h = h′ .
• R is a ‘historical necessity’ relation over dynamic states such that 〈s,h〉R〈s′,h′〉 if and only if s = s′ .
• The RA are ‘effectivity’ relations over dynamic states 〈s,h〉 such that:
– R∅ = R ◦ RX (empty-group effectivity is system unavoidability/settledness).
– RAgs = RX ◦ R (Ags effectivity is next static state unavoidability/settledness).
– RA ⊆ RB for B ⊂ A (super-groups are at least as effective; in particular, effectivity for the empty ‘group’ and possibility
for the complete group are inherited by all groups).
– For A ∩ B = ∅, if 〈s1,h1〉R〈s2,h2〉 and 〈s1,h1〉R〈s3,h3〉 then ∃s4,h4 such that 〈s1,h1〉R〈s4,h4〉, and if 〈s4,h4〉RA
〈s5,h5〉 then 〈s2,h2〉RA〈s5,h5〉, and if 〈s4,h4〉RB〈s6,h6〉 then 〈s3,h3〉RB〈s6,h6〉 (independence of group agency).
We will now consider two visualizations of the deﬁned frames. In these visualizations we will actually assume extra
properties. For instance, we will assume that any choice of A ∪ B is exactly the intersection of a choice by A and a choice
by B . This is stronger than just the coalition (anti) monotony property RA ⊆ RB for B ⊂ A, above. Also the ﬁgures will
assume that separate choices of A have an empty intersection. These properties are left out of the deﬁnition of the frames,
8 In the meta-language we use these symbols both as constant names and as variable names. The same holds for the symbols h,h′, . . . used to refer to
histories.
9 To keep the conditions listed here as readable as possible we tacitly assume universal quantiﬁcation of unbounded meta-variables over static states,
histories and groups.
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because modal logic is not strong enough to characterize intersection of relations. This means that adding these properties
to the frames would not result in a different logic. We have chosen here to deﬁne frames only in terms of conditions that
can be characterized using corresponding modal logic axioms.
Fig. 1 gives a visualization of an XSTIT-frame-part from the perspective of a single agent. We see elements from the set
of static states S pictured as little circles. Elements from the set H of histories are pictured as lines connecting the static
states. Now, it is not correct to view dynamic states as combinations of the static states and the branches departing from
them in the picture. This is because such combinations typically stand for sets of dynamic states. The reason is that the
picture does not visualize histories that come together in the past direction separately. Then, since the next time relation
is serial, meaning there are always next states (in Fig. 1 pictured using dotted lines), when viewing the system from the
standpoint of one particular static state, there are likely to be many more choices ahead. Then, each combination of future
choice points traces back to a separate history through the static state from which we look ahead. This is the reason why
the eight lines in Fig. 1 are tagged ‘Hb’, for ‘history bundle’. Note that it is not excluded that there are inﬁnitely many choice
points when following histories into the future. This means that the number of histories running through a static state can
be inﬁnite. This, in turn, means that the number of dynamic states associated with a static state can be inﬁnite. For such a
state, the historical necessity equivalence relation ranges over an inﬁnite number of histories.
Let us assume the agent in Fig. 1 is called Ag1. The choices for the agent, as given by the relation RAg1 are visualized
in Fig. 1 as ellipses. For instance, from any dynamic state built from static state s3 and any of the histories in the bundles
Hb5 and Hb6, through RAg1 we reach all the dynamic states built from static state s8 and the bundle Hb5, plus the dynamic
states built from static state s9 and the bundle Hb6. Since in stit theory acting is identiﬁed with ensuring that a condition
holds in all possibly resulting dynamic states, from s3, if the agent performs the choice ‘s3-choice 3’, which means that the
actual history is contained in this choice, the agent sees to it that ϕ , if ϕ is true in all the mentioned dynamic states.
The non-determinism of the choices of agent Ag1 in Fig. 1 is due to the fact that there is some other agent Ag2 choosing
simultaneously. However, to explain the properties concerning the interaction of the effectivity relations for different agents,
the visualization of Fig. 1 does not suﬃce. In Fig. 2, we add the second agent responsible for the non-determinism in Fig. 1.
Fig. 2 replaces the ellipses of Fig. 1 by rectangles. For each state, the choice structure for reaching a next state is now
visualized as a two player game form. The actions of Ag1 appear as columns of the game forms, the actions of Ag2 appear
as rows, the actions of the empty set of agents appear as the outmost rectangles of the game forms, and the actions of
Ags (in this case the group consisting of agents Ag1 and Ag2) appear as the smallest squares inside the game forms. Fig. 2
clearly visualizes that the static state resulting from an agent’s choice depends on the choice(s) of the other agent(s) in the
system.
Before explaining the deﬁned frame conditions in terms of this example frame, we want to emphasize that in this visual-
ization, historical necessity relative to a dynamic state only ranges over all histories through the smallest square determined
by that dynamic state. This is important, because in the visualizations of stit models in the philosophical literature, that
also use squares, historical necessity ranges over all histories within the outmost rectangle. The difference is due to the fact
that here a game form represents possible next states, while in the philosophical stit model visualizations, the rectangles
represent a partition of the current state.
In terms of the visualization of Fig. 2 the condition R∅ = R ◦ RX says that in each dynamic state (but also each static
state) the empty group of agents has exactly one choice, pictured as the big outmost rectangle of the game form for the
possible next states. More in particular, the inclusion R ◦ RX ⊆ R∅ says that the empty group of agents has only one choice
142 J. Broersen / Journal of Applied Logic 9 (2011) 137–152and has no power; it is not effective in deciding between any pair of histories whatsoever. The inclusion R∅ ⊆ R ◦ RX says
in addition that only the outcomes allowed by the empty group of agents are possible as such.
The condition RAgs = RX ◦ R says that in each dynamic state the complete group of agents has exactly one choice,
pictured in Fig. 2 as the smallest square of the game form for the possible next static states containing the actual history.
The inclusion RX ◦ R ⊆ RAgs expresses that no agent or group can make a choice between histories that through the
next state still run together. That is, even the combined choice power of all agents together (Ags) cannot separate the
histories through the next state. So, what is achieved by Ags, is settled for the next state. This corresponds to what in the
philosophical literature is called the principle of ‘no choice between undivided histories’. However, in the languages of these
logics we cannot give an axiom that corresponds to the principle. Here we get the principle as one of the central axioms.
The inclusion RAgs ⊆ RX ◦ R says that if something is settled for the next state, then that is due to the current choices
of the complete group of agents. Note that the next dynamic state is not determined by the choices of Ags. But, the next
static state is. This is the XSTIT equivalent of the semantic choice in formalisms like ATL [2,1] and CL [31] saying that the
complete set of agents uniquely determines the next state (the semantics of CL and ATL does not distinguish between static
and dynamic states).
The condition RA ⊆ RB for B ⊂ A is known as coalition (anti) monotonicity. In terms of the visualization of Fig. 2 it says
that the smallest squares (choices of the two agents combined) are contained in the larger rectangles that determine the
choices of the agents individually. The reason that we do not have the condition RA ⊂ RB for B ⊂ A is that it is always
possible to add an agent to the system that has no power at all; an agent with the same powers as the empty set of agents.
The independence of agency condition can also be explained in terms of the visualization of the two agent model in
Fig. 2. First we restate the ﬁrst-order condition in words. Assume we are in a static state s1. Then, given two histories h2
and h3 through that state, we can always ﬁnd a history h4 such that if group A has an action possibly reaching s5 over h4,
then group A can also reach s5 over h2, and if group B has an action possibly reaching s6 over h4, then group B can also
reach s6 over h3. This means, in terms of the visualization of the two agent frame in Fig. 2 that for any two histories passing
through separate choices of separate groups of agents within a game form, there is always a history through a small box
that is contained in the choice of both agents. This expresses independence of agency, because it says that the intersection
of choices of different agents is never empty. If the intersection would be allowed to be empty (little squares falling out of
the little game forms in the picture), a choice of one agent would possibly make a choice of another agent impossible.
The independence of agency property is not undisputed. Although Belnap [9] says that “If there are agents whose si-
multaneous choices are not independent, [. . .] then we shall need to treat in the theory of agency a phenomenon just as
exotic as those discovered in the land of quantum mechanics by Einstein, Podolski and Rosen.”, Chellas [18] says that “the
correctness of the something happens condition (Chellas’ term for independence of agency) must be doubted”.
Deﬁnition 2.3. A frame F = 〈S, H, RX , R, {RA | A ⊆ Ags}〉 is extended to a model M = 〈S, H, RX , R, {RA | A ⊆ Ags},π〉 by
adding a valuation π of atomic propositions:
• π is a valuation function π : P → 2S×H assigning to each atomic proposition the set of dynamic states in which they
are true.
The truth conditions for the semantics of the operators are standard. The non-standard aspect is the two-dimensionality
of the semantics, meaning that we evaluate truth with respect to dynamic states built from a dimension of histories and a
dimension of static states.
Deﬁnition 2.4. Truth M, 〈s,h〉 | ϕ , of a formula ϕ in a dynamic state 〈s,h〉 of a model M = 〈S, H, RX , R, {RA | A ⊆
Ags},π〉 is deﬁned as:
M, 〈s,h〉 | p ⇔ 〈s,h〉 ∈ π(p)
M, 〈s,h〉 | ¬ϕ ⇔ not M, 〈s,h〉 | ϕ
M, 〈s,h〉 | ϕ ∧ ψ ⇔ M, 〈s,h〉 | ϕ and M, 〈s,h〉 | ψ
M, 〈s,h〉 |ϕ ⇔ 〈s,h〉R〈s′,h′〉 implies that M, 〈s′,h′〉 | ϕ
M, 〈s,h〉 | [A xstit]ϕ ⇔ 〈s,h〉RA〈s′,h′〉 implies that M, 〈s′,h′〉 | ϕ
M, 〈s,h〉 | Xϕ ⇔ 〈s,h〉RX 〈s′,h′〉 implies that M, 〈s′,h′〉 | ϕ
Satisﬁability, validity on a frame and general validity are deﬁned as usual.
Deﬁnition 2.3 says that, like in standard stit semantics, dynamic states based on the same static state can have different
valuations of atomic propositions. In standard stit formalisms this is actually needed to give semantics to the instantaneous
effects of actions. But here, as said, the effects are not instantaneous. Therefore, in the present logic, the fact that different
histories through the same state can have different valuations of non-temporal propositions, does not carry much meaning.
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have ‘witnesses’ in the form of at least two histories separating. All these histories lead back to the current static state
to form different dynamic states in combination with it. And thus, temporal formulas evaluated on these dynamic states
might evaluate to different truth values (note that we can nest the X operator any ﬁnite number of times). That is the
reason for having these alternative histories. Now one can argue that modality-free formulas should evaluate to the same
truth value for all dynamic states based on a static state. Or, in other words, that formulas not expressing dynamic aspects
should be moment determinate. Axiomatically, this amounts to introducing the property ϕ → ϕ for ϕ any ‘stit operator-
free’ formula10 (in [17] we gave a system involving such an axiom11). Although proving that adding this axiom preserves
completeness after adding the mentioned condition to the semantics is not diﬃcult, here we will not consider addition of
the property since it is irrelevant for the central discussions in this paper.
Now we go on to the axiomatization of the logic. Given that for the conditions on the frames we have only used
properties that can be characterized using modal axioms, axiomatization is fairly easy. In particular, in designing this logic
we build up the semantic conditions on the frames and the corresponding modal axiom schemes simultaneously, while
staying within the Sahlqvist class. This ensures that the semantics cannot give rise to more logical principles than can be
proven from the axiomatization.
Deﬁnition 2.5. The following axiom schemas, in combination with a standard axiomatization for propositional logic, and the
standard rules (like necessitation) for the normal modal operators, deﬁne a Hilbert system for XSTIT:
S5 for 
KD for each [A xstit]
(Det) ¬X¬ϕ → Xϕ
(∅ = Sett) [∅ xstit]ϕ ↔Xϕ
(Ags = XSett) [Ags xstit]ϕ ↔ Xϕ
(C-Mon) [A xstit]ϕ → [A ∪ B xstit]ϕ
(Indep-G) [A xstit]ϕ ∧[B xstit]ψ →([A xstit]ϕ ∧ [B xstit]ψ) for A ∩ B = ∅
Theorem 2.1. The Hilbert system of Deﬁnition 2.5 is complete with respect to the semantics of Deﬁnition 2.4.
Proof. All axioms are in the Sahlqvist class. This means that all the axioms are expressible as ﬁrst-order conditions on
frames and that together they are complete with respect to the frame classes thus deﬁned, cf. [10, Theorem 2.42]. Now
it is easy to ﬁnd the ﬁrst-order conditions corresponding to the axioms. All correspondences are straightforward (mostly
inclusions of relations and concatenations of relations), except maybe the one for independence of agency (Indep-G). But
for that axiom we can ﬁnd the corresponding frame condition using the on-line SQEMA system [19].
So, now we know that all axioms correspond to ﬁrst-order conditions on abstract frames. In particular we know that
every formula that is consistent relative to the Hilbert system has a model based on an abstract frame. Left to show is that
we can associate such an abstract model to a concrete model based on an XSTIT frame as given in Deﬁnition 2.2. We will
sketch how to do that. We associate each world of the abstract model to a dynamic state of an XSTIT model: valuations
of atoms are directly copied. Then we associate the relation interpreting the X modality in the abstract model to a relation
RX in the XSTIT model: any maximal RX -connected set of abstract model worlds we deﬁne to be a history in the XSTIT
model. Now we have to construct the static states for the XSTIT model. We do that by looking at the relation interpreting
the modality [∅ xstit] in the abstract model. For a given world, we look at all the worlds reachable through R∅ . For the
worlds thus obtained, we look at all histories through them (because of determinism and seriality, for each world in the
abstract model there is a unique history). On all these histories, we go one step back over the RX -relation (if possible). Each
world in the set thus obtained, corresponds to a dynamic state in the XSTIT model, and all together, we take these dynamic
states to form a static state. We now have transformed the abstract model into a model in terms of histories, static states
and dynamic states. Note that the construction is nothing more than a renaming of the one-dimensional world structure
of an abstract model into the special two-dimensional dynamic state structure of an XSTIT model. This means that if the
abstract model exists, the corresponding XSTIT model exists. Also, all relational interaction properties stay intact (including
independence of agency). So, the formula true on the abstract model must also be true on the XSTIT model. 
10 In the current set-up of the logic, the only agency related substitution for ϕ for which this schema is valid is the one resulting in 〈∅ xstit〉ϕ →〈∅ xstit〉ϕ . Completeness says we can derive this in the Hilbert system of Deﬁnition 2.5, which is easy to verify.
11 In instantaneous stit there is a similar concern with the alternative histories through the present instantaneous choice. Belnap mentions the issue in
[9], p. 31, footnote 4, but does not express any preference regarding introduction of such a property.
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(see the article in [9]). The present stit logic is different from Xu’s in two respects: (1) actions take effect in next states, and
(2) agency is with respect to groups of agents, while Xu’s stit only considers agency of individual agents. However, these
two major differences with the present logic do not have signiﬁcant implications for the view on independence of agency;
the associated axiom generalizes smoothly to group agency.
Pauly’s Coalition Logic [31] is a logic of ability that is closely related to stit formalisms. In particular, in [15] it is shown
that Coalition Logic can be embedded in instantaneous stit logic. For the present logic, at this point it is still unclear
whether or not we can embed Coalition Logic. The tempting translation of Coalition Logic’s central modality [A]ϕ as [A]ϕ :=[A xstit]ϕ does not work, because the resulting fragment is not strong enough to validate Coalition Logic’s Ags-maximality
axiom. The mentioned translation would translate Coalition Logic’s maximality axiom into ¬[∅ xstit]¬ϕ →[Ags xstit]ϕ .
We can also write this as 〈∅ xstit〉ϕ →[Ags xstit]ϕ , where we recognize a variant on the well-known McKinsey property
that is not ﬁrst-order deﬁnable. That is not a problem in itself; it is very well possible that non-Sahlqvist axioms are
derivable as theorems in a Sahlqvist logic. However, the property is not valid in XSTIT.12 A counterexample in terms of the
visualization of Fig. 2 is to take a dynamic state built from a history h in bundle Hb7 and static state s10 and declare atomic
proposition p to be true in it. Now we also demand that there is at least one dynamic state based on static state s10 for
which proposition p is false, and that there is at least one dynamic state based on static state s11 for which proposition p
is false. Now, in the dynamic state one step back along the same history h, that is, in the dynamic state built from history h
and static state s3, we have that 〈∅ xstit〉p is true, while [Ags xstit]p is false. Note that this does not say that translation
of Coalition Logic is not possible. Interesting in this respect is that XSTIT does incorporate a notion of maximality; but, it
has a slightly different axiomatic form. This is because we evaluate truth with respect to dynamic states and not, as in
CL or ATL with respect to static states. The form we get for maximality is 〈∅ xstit〉ϕ → [Ags xstit]ϕ . This says that no
other entities in the system but agents are responsible for conditions becoming inevitable. The property is derivable in the
system we have. From (∅ = Sett) [∅ xstit]ϕ ↔ Xϕ , dualities for boxes and diamonds and seriality and determinism for X
we derive 〈∅ xstit〉ϕ ↔Xϕ . Performing the uniform substitution [ϕ/ϕ] yields 〈∅ xstit〉ϕ ↔Xϕ . Then, with axiom
(Ags= XSett) [Ags xstit]ϕ ↔ Xϕ we arrive at 〈∅ xstit〉ϕ ↔[Ags xstit]ϕ .
3. The concept of ‘knowingly doing’
In this section we extend XSTIT with epistemic operators Kaϕ for knowledge of individual agents a. This will enable
us to express the concept of ‘knowingly doing’. Herzig and Troquard were the ﬁrst to consider the addition of knowledge
operators to a stit logic [23]. Later on the framework was adapted and extended by Broersen, Herzig and Troquard [17,16].
This section extends earlier work in several ways. In particular, three axioms for the interaction of knowledge and action
are proposed. Also the semantics, being two-dimensional (see Deﬁnition 2.4), is different from the one in [17]. Finally,
the modeled concept is ‘knowingly doing’, whereas in e.g. [23] the aim is to model ‘knowing how’. These concepts are
different: ‘knowing how’ should be about whether an agent has a plan it knows to be effective. ‘Knowing how’ then seems
to be a concept involving subsequent choice points, one that cannot be approached in the one-shot stit setting given here.
Also, ‘knowing how’ is an epistemic qualiﬁcation concerning an ability, while ‘knowingly doing’ is an epistemic qualiﬁcation
concerning an action.
Deﬁnition 3.1. Given a countable set of propositions P and p ∈ P , and given a ﬁnite set Ags of agent names, and a ∈ Ags
and A ⊆ Ags, we extend the formal language to:
ϕ := p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | Kaϕ |ϕ | [A xstit]ϕ | Xϕ
We will not advocate one speciﬁc epistemic extension of the base XSTIT logic of Section 2. Instead we show how to
extend the XSTIT frames with an epistemic indistinguishability relation, and then suggest several logical properties for
the notion of ‘knowingly doing’ that could be incorporated in an epistemic extension of the XSTIT logic.13 The suggested
properties are again in the Sahlqvist class, which means that in combination with the deﬁnition in Section 2 they yield a
complete logic. First we extend the frames with the indistinguishability relation and deﬁne the semantics.
Deﬁnition 3.2. An epistemic XSTIT frame is a tuple 〈S, H, RX , R, {RA | A ⊆ Ags}, {∼a | a ∈ Ags}〉 such that:
• 〈S, H, RX , R, {RA | A ⊆ Ags}〉 is an XSTIT-frame.
• The ∼a are epistemic equivalence relations over dynamic states.
12 [12] claims embedding of Coalition Logic for that paper’s version of XSTIT. Although maximality is derivable in that stronger version, we are no longer
sure about soundness of the other direction of the mapping. As said, that paper’s version of XSTIT is not the intended one.
13 Of course, a danger of this approach to building logics is that we make them too strong. In particular we always have to make sure that combinations
of properties do not make the logic inconsistent.
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{∼a | a ∈ Ags},π〉 is deﬁned as:
All relevant clauses from Deﬁnition 2.4, plus:
M, 〈s,h〉 | Kaϕ ⇔ 〈s,h〉 ∼a 〈s′,h′〉 implies that M, 〈s′,h′〉 | ϕ
Satisﬁability, validity on a frame and general validity are deﬁned as usual.
With the above deﬁnitions we can express that agent a knowingly sees to it that ϕ as Ka[a xstit]ϕ , where we slightly
abuse notation by denoting [{a} xstit]ϕ as [a xstit]ϕ . The semantics is in terms of models with epistemic equivalence sets
(information sets) containing dynamic states. An agent a knowingly does ϕ if the formula [a xstit]ϕ holds for all the dynamic
states in the epistemic equivalence set containing the actual dynamic state.
It is important to emphasize that the notion of ‘knowingly doing’ differs from other notions in the literature combining
knowledge and action or time. For instance, if we add epistemic uncertainty relations to temporal logic or dynamic logics,
the choice is usually to deﬁne them over static states (see e.g. [24]). In that case uncertainty, and thus knowledge, cannot
concern actions or choices themselves, but only state-determinate conditions. Only if we let uncertainty range over dynamic
states, as for the present logic, we can talk about knowledge of what agents are doing.
Let us brieﬂy go through the different notions expressible. As said above, ‘knowingly doing’ is modeled by Ka[a xstit]ϕ .
Then, ‘having the ability to do something’, where we assume that ability involves that the agent knows what it is doing
when it exercises its ability, is expressed as Ka[a xstit]ϕ . With a strategic notion of stit, as in [16] or [14] the strategic
notion of ‘knowing how’ can be expressed as Ka[a sstit]ϕ . However, we will not consider the strategic setting, and thus
the ‘knowing how’ setting here. The notion of ‘knowing to have the capacity to cause a certain effect, without knowing
what to do to cause that effect’, is expressed as Ka[a xstit]ϕ . An agent seeing to it that it knows something, or, learns, is
expressed by [a xstit]Kaϕ . Other variations speak for themselves.
We will now discuss three possible properties for knowingly doing. We will present them as axioms in the language
of Deﬁnition 3.1 and give the corresponding ﬁrst-order conditions on the frames of Deﬁnition 3.2. The ﬁrst property says
that what an agent can know about the next state is never more than what it can knowingly do. The axiom is Ka Xϕ →
Ka[a xstit]ϕ (this property does not hold if the stit operator is replaced by a deliberative stit operator as deﬁned in Section 4).
Proposition 3.1. The ‘knowledge about next states’ (XK) property, axiomatically expressed as Ka Xϕ → Ka[a xstit]ϕ , is in the Sahlqvist
class and corresponds to the extra ﬁrst-order condition ∼a ◦ Ra ⊆ ∼a ◦ RX on the frames of Deﬁnition 3.2.
In terms of the frames, the property says that epistemic equivalence sets are closed under choices.14 The property
ensures that an agent cannot know that two histories belonging to the same choice are different, or, in other words, for
any agent the histories within its own choices are indistinguishable. This means that agents cannot know more about next
states than what is affected by the choices they have. Formulated differently, the property says that agents can only know
things about the (immediate) future if they are the result of an action they themselves knowingly perform. Then, an agent
unknowingly does everything that is (1) true for all the dynamic states belonging to the actual choice it makes in the actual
state, but (2) not true for all the dynamic states it considers possible. In general the things an agent does unknowingly vastly
outnumber the things an agent knows it does. For instance, by sending an email, we may enforce many, many things we
are not aware of, which are nevertheless the result of sending the email. All these things we do unknowingly by knowingly
sending the email.
We might say that the property Ka Xϕ → Ka[a xstit]ϕ is a consequence of the assumption that agents cannot know what
actions other agents perform concurrently. The independence property (Indep-G) guarantees that choices of agents always
reﬁne choices of other agents. Then, if an agent would know about the choices of other agents, it would know more about
the future than what is guaranteed by its own choice.
The second property we discuss, concerns the idea that the effects of an action that is knowingly performed are known
in the next state. We can call this the dynamic version of the well-known ‘perfect recall’ or ‘no forgetting’ axiom from the
literature on the interaction between epistemic and temporal modalities.
Proposition 3.2. The ‘effect recollection’ (ER) property, axiomatically expressed as Ka[a xstit]ϕ → XKaϕ , is in the Sahlqvist class and
corresponds to the extra ﬁrst-order condition R X ◦ ∼a ⊆ ∼a ◦ Ra on the frames of Deﬁnition 3.2.
According to the property (ER), if agents knowingly see to it that a condition holds in the next state, in that same next
state they will recall that the condition holds. Like for the previous property, of course, we cannot claim that this is a
property that is necessarily true for all systems of agents. Yet it is a property that we can impose for idealized agents that
are not forgetful.
Finally, we discuss an interaction property concerning knowledge and historical possibility.
14 A border case is where the information sets are exactly the choices in each state. In that case an agent knows all the consequences of its actions.
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Sahlqvist class and corresponds to the following extra ﬁrst-order conﬂuency condition on the frames of Deﬁnition 3.2:
if 〈s1,h1〉R〈s2,h2〉 and 〈s1,h1〉 ∼a 〈s3,h3〉 then ∃s4,h4 such that 〈s2,h2〉 ∼a 〈s4,h4〉 and 〈s3,h3〉R〈s4,h4〉
If for ϕ we substitute the central stit modality, the formula expresses the relation between a de-dicto and de-re in-
terpretation of knowingly doing: Ka[a xstit]ϕ → Ka[a xstit]ϕ . This property says that if an agent can knowingly see to
it that ϕ , then it knows that among its repertoire of choices there is one ensuring ϕ . This property is the stit version of
the constraint concerning ‘uniform strategies’ game-theorists talk about. In game theory, uniformity of strategies requires
that agents have the same choice type in all states within information sets. Since in game theory choice types are given
names, the uniformity constraint says that from each state within the information set it is possible to exercise choices
with the same name. In the present stit setting, we do not have names for action types. But the intuition that uniformity
means that exertion of the same choice types should be possible in different states of an information set, still applies. The
property Ka[a xstit]ϕ → Ka[a xstit]ϕ captures this intuition. It says that if an agent has the possibility to knowingly
see to it that ϕ , then in each of the states it considers possible at least one of its choices actually ensures ϕ (that is,
a ϕ-action is possible in all states of the information set). Maybe it is easier to see that the negation of the property, that isKa[a xstit]ϕ ∧ K̂a〈a xstit〉¬ϕ (with K̂a the dual of Ka), is contradictory: it would be absurd if an agent has the possibility
to knowingly see to it that ϕ and at the same time would consider it an epistemic possibility that it is settled that whatever
it does, it allows for ¬ϕ as a possible outcome. Yet another way of phrasing the property is to say that ‘true ability’ obeys
the property of uniformity of strategies.
4. Modeling the act involved in an actus reus
In this section we will consider how the theory developed in the previous sections can help us to formalize the action
involved in an ‘actus reus’. As explained in the introduction, an actus reus must be a voluntary act. Some aspects of the
concept ‘voluntary’ are captured by the stit notion of ‘deliberative action’. A deliberative stit operator adds an extra condition
to the standard XSTIT-operator, the so called ‘negative condition’ [26], to avoid the property [A xstit]. The idea is that
agents should not be able to bring about things that will be true inevitably, but only things that without their intervention
might not become true. We can easily deﬁne a deliberative version of the stit operator.
Deﬁnition 4.1. The deliberative stit operator [A dxstit]ϕ is deﬁned by:
[A dxstit]ϕ ≡def [A xstit]ϕ ∧ ¬Xϕ
Below, we will refer to ¬Xϕ as the ‘side-condition’, or, following [26], as the ‘negative condition’.
Proposition 4.1. The operator [A dxstit]ϕ , is a weak modal operator closed under logical equivalence, obeying the D schema
[A dxstit]ϕ → 〈A dxstit〉ϕ , but not obeying the weakening schema [A dxstit]ϕ → [A dxstit](ϕ ∨ ψ), or the agglomeration schema
[A dxstit]ϕ ∧ [A dxstit]ψ → [A dxstit](ϕ ∧ ψ).
Proof. Like any operator deﬁned in terms of normal modal operators, the operator [A dxstit]ϕ is closed under logical equiv-
alence.
To check that the deﬁned operator satisﬁes the D schema, we ﬁll in its deﬁnition to get [A xstit]ϕ ∧ ¬Xϕ →
¬([A xstit]¬ϕ ∧ ¬X¬ϕ). Propositional rewriting gives [A xstit]ϕ ∧ ¬Xϕ → ¬[A xstit]¬ϕ ∨ X¬ϕ . This follows from
the D schema for the operator [A xstit]ϕ .
Weakening holds for the deﬁned operator if and only if [A xstit]ϕ ∧¬Xϕ → [A xstit](ϕ ∨ψ)∧¬X(ϕ ∨ψ) holds in the
logics for the constituting operators. Propositional rewriting gives [A xstit]ϕ ∧X¬ϕ → [A xstit](ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧X(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ).
Now it is easy to ﬁnd a counterexample for this expanded schema: there being a possibility for the negative condition ¬ϕ
does not imply there is a possibility for the two negative conditions ¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ .
For agglomeration, again the negative condition is the spoiler: a possibility for a negative condition ¬ϕ and a possibility
for a negative condition ¬ψ together do not imply the possibility for a negative condition ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ). 
So, deliberateness, as deﬁned in the operator above, seems to capture at least part of what it means to act voluntarily:
one could also have acted otherwise, and thus one acts voluntarily. For instance, in the introduction, the crashing into the
person breaking the fall of the man thrown off the building is not a voluntary act of the falling man, because the man had
no choice but to fall, with the drastic consequence as a result.
However, this is not the only thing we can say about voluntary/deliberate acts. Voluntariness seems to involve more
than just having had the possibility to do otherwise. Consider the following example. You carry a very dangerous contagious
disease. But you do not know it. You travel by train and choose to sit next to some person and thereby unknowingly see
to it that he is fatally infected. Now has an actus reus been committed (assuming spreading fatal diseases is forbidden by
law)? The answer must be no. Even though it is true that you did spread the disease, and even though you could have done
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extent, you did not know what you were doing.
So deliberateness or voluntariness entails both the possibility to do otherwise and having knowledge of what it is one is
doing. Even more, an agent should have knowledge about the side-condition also: if an agent does not know that it could
have done otherwise, we would not call the action deliberate. For the epistemic position on the side-condition, we then
have two possibilities, motivating two new deﬁnitions for deliberate action.
Deﬁnition 4.2. The deliberative stit alternatives [a dxstit]′ϕ and [a dxstit]′′ϕ are deﬁned by:
[a dxstit]′ϕ ≡def Ka[a xstit]ϕ ∧ Ka¬Xϕ
[a dxstit]′′ϕ ≡def Ka[a xstit]ϕ ∧ ¬KaXϕ
The ﬁrst notion says that deliberativeness requires that the agent not only knowingly performs the action, but also that
the agent knows that the result is not settled, and thus that his action is needed to guarantee the result. The second notion
has a different side-condition: the agent only considers it possible that the result is not settled.
Proposition 4.2. The operators [a dxstit]′ϕ and [a dxstit]′′ϕ are weak modal operators closed under logical equivalence, obeying the
D schema, but not obeying the weakening schema, or the agglomeration schema.
Proof. Involvement of the knowledge operator only requires minor adaptations of the proofs given for Proposition 4.1. 
By having suggested some deﬁnitions for capturing the voluntariness aspect of an actus reus, we have actually already
touched upon the notion of mens rea. This is because talking about epistemic aspects of action clearly already introduces
‘the mind’ as a relevant concept in describing action. But we have not modeled any deontic aspects yet, and thus at this
point we still cannot talk about the ‘guilt’ aspect of mens rea. Deontic aspects will be the subject of the next section.
5. Deontic modalities and modes of mens rea
For the extension of our framework with an operator for ‘ought-to-do’, we adapt the approach taken by Bartha [7] who
introduces Anderson style [3] violation constants in stit theory. The approach with violation constants is very well suited for
theories of ought-to-do, witness the many logics based on adding violation constants to dynamic logic [28,13]. However, we
believe that the stit setting is even more amenable to this approach. Some evidence for this is found in Bartha’s article [7],
that shows that many deontic logic puzzles (paradoxes) are representable in an intuitive way. And for the present paper a
clear advantage of deﬁning obligation as a reduction using violation constants, is that the completeness established for the
logics in the previous sections is preserved after addition of the obligation operator. For the violation constant we will use
the special proposition V ∈ P .
Bartha [7] deﬁnes his reduction for ‘obligation to do’ within the classical instantaneous stit setting. Here we adapt that
to the present situation where actions only take effect in next states. The intuition behind the deﬁnition is straightforward:
an agent is obliged to do something if and only if by not performing the obliged action, it performs a violation. Since the
effect of the obliged action can only be felt in next states, violations also have to be properties of next states. Formally, our
ﬁrst deﬁnition is given by:
Deﬁnition 5.1. The operator O [a xstit]ϕ expressing obligation of agent a to see to it that ϕ , under strict liability, is deﬁned
by:
O [a xstit]ϕ ≡def (¬[a xstit]ϕ → [a xstit]V )
Proposition 5.1. The operator O [a xstit]ϕ is KD, that is, it has the same properties as Standard Deontic Logic [33].
Proof. Rewrite (¬[a xstit]ϕ → [a xstit]V ) as ([a xstit]ϕ ∨ [a xstit]V ). To prove normality, we prove that ([a xstit]ϕ ∨
[a xstit]V ) ∧([a xstit]ψ ∨ [a xstit]V ) ↔([a xstit](ϕ ∧ ψ) ∨ [a xstit]V ) (∗). This schema is true for every ϕ and for every ψ
in any world of any model based on any frame of the kind given in Deﬁnition 2.2 if and only if [a xstit]ϕ ∧[a xstit]ψ ↔[a xstit](ϕ ∧ ψ) (∗∗) is true for every ϕ and for every ψ in any world of any model based on any frame of the kind
given in Deﬁnition 2.2. For the right to left direction of this claim: assume schema (∗∗) and assume that there is a ϕ ,
a ψ , and a dynamic state 〈s,h〉 in a model M based on a frame of Deﬁnition 2.2 bearing witness to the fact that schema
(∗) is false. Now in all three main parts of schema (∗), there is the same ([a xstit](· · · ∨ [a xstit]V )) formula fragment.
So in dynamic state 〈s,h〉 of the model M , in each part of the schema, this formula fragment evaluates to the same
value. If it evaluates to false in 〈s,h〉, then we get that ([a xstit]ϕ ∨ ⊥) ∧ ([a xstit]ψ ∨ ⊥) ↔ ([a xstit](ϕ ∧ ψ) ∨ ⊥)
is false in 〈s,h〉, which contradicts the assumption about validity of schema (∗∗). If it evaluates to true in 〈s,h〉, we get
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(∗) is false in 〈s,h〉. For the right to left direction, very similar considerations apply. The validity of (∗∗) follows from
normality of both the  and the [a xstit] operators. This proves normality of O [a xstit]ϕ .
The proof of normality demonstrates that the logical properties of deﬁned operators do not depend on ‘constant’ parts
of the deﬁnition. For the present deﬁnition this means that the logical properties of O [a xstit]ϕ are the same as the ones for[a xstit]ϕ . The necessity operator  is S5, and [a xstit] is KD. Using standard normal modal logic correspondence theory
we conclude that the combined operator [a xstit]ϕ is KD. So, the deﬁned operator O [a xstit]ϕ is also KD. 
The  operator in the deﬁnition ensures that obligations are ‘moment determinate’ [25]. A formula is moment deter-
minate in the given two-dimensional semantics if its truth value only depends on the state, and not on the history. This
means a formula ϕ is moment determinate if ϕ → ϕ is valid. Since the  operator is transitive, this makes any formula
starting with the  operator moment determinate. The implication is that the obligations modeled by our deﬁnitions are
not conditional on choices (see [32] for a discussion on the moment-determinateness of obligation).
In this section we will not consider the ‘side-conditions’ we discussed in the previous section. But these could, of course,
easily be added to model the ‘could have done otherwise’ aspect of ‘deliberateness’. Considering side-conditions would
result in yet other categories.
Note that ¬[a xstit]ϕ expresses that a does not see to it that ϕ , which is the same as saying that a allows a choice for
which ¬ϕ is a possible outcome. The deﬁnition then says that all such choices do guarantee that a violation occurs. So the
agent is liable, because its action bore the risk of a bad outcome. The above deﬁned obligation is thus a personal one. If,
by coincidence, ϕ occurs, apparently due the action of other agents, while the agent bearing the obligation did not make
a choice that ensured that ϕ would occur, a violation is guaranteed. So agents do not escape an obligation by having other
agents do the work for them.
We can also make the deﬁnition a little weaker and say that the agent is only liable if the agent actually guarantees the
bad outcome:
Deﬁnition 5.2. The operator O ′[a xstit]ϕ expressing obligation of agent a to see to it that ϕ , under strict liability, is deﬁned
by:
O ′[a xstit]ϕ ≡def ([a xstit]¬ϕ → [a xstit]V )
Proposition 5.2. The operator O ′[a xstit]ϕ is a monotonic (i.e., weak)modal logic obeying the D schema.
Proof. Leaving out the constant part of the deﬁnition (see the proof of Proposition 5.1), we have to check the properties of
the combination 〈a xstit〉ϕ . We recognize a normal simulation of monotonic modal logic. Since S5 obeys D, the monotonic
simulation inherits D. 
Because the above two deﬁnitions do not at all refer to an agent’s beliefs or other mental state, they both capture
variants of the mens rea mode of strict liability. For both deﬁnitions it is the case that if there is a violation, the agent is
liable whatsoever, independent of whether or not the agent knows what it is doing. But, in our opinion this also includes
the mens rea mode of negligence. As described in the introduction, this class concerns those cases where ‘a normal person’
would have realized the consequences of his action. So, again, it does not matter what that agent knows about what it is
doing, it is liable whatsoever. The only difference with the strict liability class is that there can be discussion about what a
normal person can foresee, and thus, about whether something should be strictly liable or not.
Now we turn our attention to the mens rea classes knowingly acting and recklessness. It is clear that to deﬁne these, we
have to use the concept of ‘knowingly doing’ as deﬁned in the previous section. We have several options, corresponding
to different modes of mens rea. We consider the three modes connected to the three obligation operators deﬁned in the
following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 5.3. The operators O K [a xstit]ϕ , O K ′[a xstit]ϕ and O K ′′[a xstit]ϕ expressing obligation of agent a to see to it that
ϕ , under respectively the mens rea classes (1) acting recklessly, (2) knowingly risking and (3) acting knowingly, are deﬁned by:
O K [a xstit]ϕ ≡def (¬Ka[a xstit]ϕ → [a xstit]V )
O K ′[a xstit]ϕ ≡def (Ka¬[a xstit]ϕ → [a xstit]V )
O K ′′[a xstit]ϕ ≡def (Ka[a xstit]¬ϕ → [a xstit]V )
The ﬁrst operator, that is O K [a xstit]ϕ , captures the mens rea mode of acting recklessly. Here the agent has to knowingly
see to it that ϕ obtains, since otherwise there will be a violation. In other words, if the agent is reckless, and does an action
that it knows does not exclude an unlawful outcome, it is liable.
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if the agent knowingly sees to it that the opposite of the lawful outcome ϕ obtains.
Finally, the second operator, that is O K ′[a xstit]ϕ deﬁnes a mode of mens rea in between acting recklessly and acting
knowingly. It says that the agent is liable if it knowingly refrains from obtaining ϕ . So, on the one hand, there is an aspect
of recklessness: if the agent knowingly omits to do something, a violation occurs, because omitting may risk an undesirable
consequence. On the other hand, if omitting is seen as a form of doing, we can also say that this expresses that there is a
violation if the agent knowingly ‘does’ the for this level of mens rea inexcusable omission.
Proposition 5.3. The operator O K [a xstit]ϕ is KD, that is, it has the same properties as Standard Deontic Logic [33]. The operators
O K ′[a xstit]ϕ and O K ′′[a xstit]ϕ are monotonic (weak)modal operator obeying the D schema. In particular, the operators do not obey
agglomeration.
Proof. For O K [a xstit]ϕ the proof is similar to the one for Proposition 5.1. Here the knowledge modality is extra, which
means that we have to investigate the logical behavior of the combination Ka[a xstit]ϕ , that is, a combination of S5, S5
and KD. This yields KD. For O K ′[a xstit]ϕ and O K ′′[a xstit]ϕ the proofs are similar to the one for Theorem 5.2. 
6. Being excused not knowing the law
In the deﬁnitions of the previous section, the focus was on the actus reus itself, and whether or not the actus reus was
a knowingly performed act, a reckless act, an omission, etc. That, in itself, has nothing to do with whether or not the agent
involved knows about whether or not the act it is conducting is actually an actus reus. So, what the Deﬁnitions 5.1, 5.2
and 5.3 say, is that obligations cannot be escaped by not knowing the law; in whatever way the actus reus is conducted
(knowingly, recklessly, etc.) the obligation deﬁnes that as an effect there will be a violation. So, for these deﬁnitions, the
agent cannot come with the excuse that it did not know that it brought about a violation. The deﬁnitions say that it does
not matter whether or not the bringing about of the violation is knowingly performed. So, the deﬁnitions of the previous
section actually incorporate the juridical principle of “ignorantia juris non excusat”.
However, we might want to deﬁne that not knowing about the law is actually an excuse. In that case we have to adapt
the deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 6.1. The operators K O K [a xstit]ϕ , K O K ′[a xstit]ϕ and K O K ′′[a xstit]ϕ expressing obligation of agent a to see to it
that ϕ , under respectively the mens rea classes (1) acting recklessly, (2) knowingly risking and (3) acting knowingly, avoiding
the principle “ignorantia juris non excusat”, are deﬁned by:
K O K [a xstit]ϕ ≡def (¬Ka[a xstit]ϕ → Ka[a xstit]V )
K O K ′[a xstit]ϕ ≡def (Ka¬[a xstit]ϕ → Ka[a xstit]V )
K O K ′′[a xstit]ϕ ≡def (Ka[a xstit]¬ϕ → Ka[a xstit]V )
These deﬁnitions require that being obliged to see to something implies one knowingly brings about a violation in case
of non-compliance. This means that under these three notions of obligation an agent is excused when it does not know it
brings about an obligation in case of non-compliance.
Proposition 6.1. The operator K O K [a xstit]ϕ is KD, that is, it has the same properties as Standard Deontic Logic [33]. The operators
K O K ′[a xstit]ϕ and K O K ′′[a xstit]ϕ are monotonic (weak) modal operator obeying the D schema. In particular, the operators do not
obey agglomeration.
Proof. No difference with the properties for Proposition 5.3 because the difference is only in the constant part of the
operator deﬁnitions. 
Note that the deﬁnitions of this section take nothing away from the rationale behind the deﬁnitions of the previous
section. If we want to allow not knowing about the law as an excuse, the deﬁnitions of the present section apply, and if we
do not want that, we should use the deﬁnitions of the previous section.
Of course, looking at the formal structure of the deﬁnitions of this section and the previous section, a fourth deﬁnition
suggests itself: one where it is not necessary to perform the obliged action knowingly, while at the same time, in case of
non-compliance, the violation is brought about knowingly. But it seems clear right away that this combination is absurd.
We cannot knowingly bring about a violation by unknowingly failing to comply with an obligation.
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This paper presents an epistemic temporal stit formalism that is complete with respect to a two-dimensional Kripke
semantics. It introduces the new notion of ‘knowingly doing’ and discusses some of its possible properties. Using this
notion, new epistemic variants of operators for ‘ought-to-do’ are deﬁned. In particular, several modes of mens rea and
characteristics of what counts as an actus reus, as deﬁned in the juridical literature, can be analyzed and deﬁned in the
framework.
7.1. Implications and general conclusions
The ﬁrst conclusion to be drawn from this work is that the logic XSTIT and its possible epistemic extensions can function
as a sound and complete basis for studying and characterizing the notion of mens rea by deﬁning the associated levels of
deontic strength as deontic operators. Since the suggested epistemic extensions are based on Sahlqvist properties, and the
suggested deontic extensions are based on the introduction of a violation constant, we have a complete logic for all the
deﬁned deontic (and non-deontic) operators.
The second general conclusion is that our logic framework is useful for disambiguating and precisely deﬁning action
classes from the juridical literature. This is exempliﬁed by the fact that in our deﬁnitions a new natural level of mens
rea in between ‘acting knowingly’ and ‘acting recklessly’ suggested itself: ‘knowingly risking’. Furthermore, it is clear that
we showed quite some restraint in deﬁning different classes; many more subtle combinations are possible, for instance
by demanding ‘ought implies can’, ‘side-conditions’, etc. This suggests that the classiﬁcation from the juridical literature
could be much more subtle and ﬁne-grained than it is, and the present framework could be of help in deﬁning such a
classiﬁcation.
A third conclusion we can draw is one about deontic logic in general. Sometimes, in discussions with other logicians,
deontic logicians have to defend deontic logic against the claim that there is not a single principle of deontic logic that
is non-disputed. And indeed, if one aims at designing a ‘core’ logic of deontic reasoning, one is likely to end up with a
very weak system, since for every suggested principle, some deontic logician will raise his hand and come with a concrete
scenario and the claim that this is a counterexample. However, we think that such counterexamples often introduce context
that interferes with the pure deontic reasoning. For instance, the present paper makes clear that the concepts of action and
knowledge may interact with the concept of obligation in many different subtle ways, giving rise to a whole plethora of
deﬁnitions for ought-to-do. And then there can also be other concepts interfering, like time and intention. If we want to
account for all the modalities that interfere with the pure deontic modalities, and deﬁne deontic modalities acknowledging
the interactions, we get weaker logics. And this mimics closely the complaint of logicians that there is not a single principle
that is not disputed. Our impression is thus, that the lack of logical properties is not inherent to deontic logic. It is only that
deontic modalities often appear to be rather weak because they are contaminated with other, non-deontic modalities. One of
the tasks of deontic logicians is then to expose the contamination, and bring all interfering modalities to the foreground. In
particular, we can view the present work as part of a greater project in search for the ‘building blocks’ of deontic modalities.
The building blocks investigated in this paper are then ‘action’ and ‘knowledge’.
7.2. Related work
In [30] a logic is presented whose semantics shares several features with ours. In particular, the logic has epistemic
indistinguishability relations ranging over dynamic states. However, actions are omitted. In [29] actions are added to this
framework by using action names in the models and the object language. So, the authors take a, what we might call
‘dynamic logic view’ on action. The work focusses on the so-called ‘knowledge based obligations’. The central idea is that
when agents get to know more, there are less histories they consider possible, which in turn may induce that the subset
of deontically optimal histories, may give rise to new obligations. So the phenomenon being studied is that new knowledge
may induce new obligations.
In our setting the phenomenon of getting more obligations by an increase in knowledge can occur in different ways. One
way is simply by becoming aware of an obligation, that is, getting to know that one knowingly performs a violation by not
performing some obliged action. Another way in which we can enable that obligations arise as the result of new knowledge,
is by adopting the ‘ought implies can’ principle for the stronger variants of our obligation operator. If agents get to know
how to do something knowingly, they might incur an obligation that previously did not apply due to ‘ought implies can’.
This demonstrates that there seem to be more sides to the problem of ‘knowledge based obligation’ then the mechanisms
suggested in [29].
Another well-known interaction between epistemic and deontic modalities is Åqvist’s puzzle of ‘the knower’ [4]. If knowl-
edge is modeled using S5 and obligation using KD (SDL [33]), from O Kϕ we derive Oϕ , which is clearly undesirable in an
ought-to-be reading. However, this problem does not arise in the present logic, because obligation is strictly limited to apply
to actions. In particular, if in Åqvist’s example, for ϕ we substitute the stit action [α xstit]ϕ , then we can read the deriva-
tion as ‘the obligation to knowingly see to something implies the obligation to see to that same something’. In the present
framework, that is not an undesirably property, but a desirable property obeyed by our deﬁnitions; in our formalism it is
valid that O K [a xstit]ϕ → O [a xstit]ϕ .
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The framework we considered asks for extension in several ways. Note ﬁrst that while the operators for agency are
group operators, the operators for knowledge and obligation only refer to single agents. There are many open questions
about how to generalize these operators to group operators. As is well known, there are several notions of group-knowledge,
such as ‘shared knowledge’, ‘common knowledge’ and ‘distributed knowledge’. Which ones combine with which interaction
properties for knowledge and group-action is yet unclear. Likewise we can consider generalizing the obligation operator to
a group operator. Given the deﬁnitions of Section 5 this actually hinges on providing group operators for the knowledge
modalities.
Another issue concerns the violation constants. According to the present deﬁnitions, they are not relativized to agents
or sets of agents. This corresponds to a ‘consequentialist’s’ view on obligation, as in [25], where deontic optimality is deter-
mined according to an ordering of all possible histories. We could also take the view, like in [27], that deontic optimality
orderings should be relative to agents or groups of agents. For our setting, using violation constants, that would mean that
we would have to introduce a separate violation constant for each agent or each group.
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